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Abstract
Context: Software project cancellations are often caused by mistakes made during the project, and such
cancellations make a strong economic impact. We analyzed five cancelled software engineering projects. One
case was an internal product development project of a company that sells products to its customers. The other
four cases were different software engineering projects, and outcomes of these projects were planned to be
delivered to external customers.
Objective: This study reports a post-mortem analysis of five software engineering projects with the aim of
providing more knowledge about the reasons for cancellation decisions and the causes behind those reasons.
Method: The research method is case study. A method for a document-based post-mortem analysis was
developed and post-mortem analysis was performed. All project documentation was available for analysis.
Results: The reasons for the cancellation decisions were well-known ones. In four cases of five, the
outcome of the project was to be delivered to an external customer, but in these cases the causes of the
cancellation reasons were not found from the normal project documentation. In these cases the cause of the
cancellation originated in a phase before the start of the project and therefore the project was doomed before
it was started.
Conclusion: It is reasonable to suggest that a remarkable portion of project cancellations are due to mis-
takes made before the project is started in the case of contract-based software engineering projects.
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1. Introduction
A cancelled software project is usually an un-
wanted situation which means loss of economic re-
sources, despair, and embarrassment. A large can-
celled software project may ruin careers and even
exterminate companies. Software development his-
tory has numerous examples of project cancellations
as well as consequences of software project cancel-
lations. Unfortunately, it is likely that there are no
easy means to avoid or reduce software project can-
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cellations.
The economic impact of project cancellations
is difficult to measure in any meaningful way, and
even the percentage of cancelled projects is not clear
(Glass, 2005). A project cancellation, sometimes
called an abandonment, is a situation in which prac-
tically nothing, or even nothing at all, is salvaged
from the project. A project cancellation is something
that nobody wants to flaunt, and therefore getting
an even reasonably accurate estimate of how many
projects are cancelled is next to impossible. Some es-
timates have, however, been presented. For example,
Charette (2005) estimated that 5-15% of all large-
scale software projects are cancelled in the USA, and
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that the total yearly cost of cancellations may be as
much as US$75 billion.
Assuming that Charette’s estimates are correct,
the number of cancellations is daunting and their
economic impact significant. The motivation of this
paper is to investigate ways to reduce the number
of cancellations. The basic approach to achieve
that goal is obvious: if we do not conduct post-
mortem reviews, we are unlikely to understand why
our projects fail (Cerpa and Verner, 2009). Analysis
of cancelled projects enables us to modify and im-
prove the software development process (Reel, 1999)
and to identify critical decision points before and
during the project execution.
The way to avoid past mistakes is by understand-
ing what went wrong and how it could have been
avoided. Good answers to these questions regarding
cancelled software projects are not, however, gener-
ally available. This makes general advancement of
our software engineering project knowledge much
more difficult. There are at least two reasons for the
unavailability: the small percentage of projects that
go through a post-mortem analysis (Glass, 2002),
and the general unavailability of knowledge of can-
celled software projects.
The first problem, the small percentage of
projects analyzed, is not restricted to the software
engineering field — some surveys have revealed that
80% of all R&D projects are not reviewed at all after
completion (von Zedtwitz, 2002). In that sense, soft-
ware engineers, whether practitioners or researchers,
are in the same situation as other professions. The
fact that the situation is not very good in other pro-
fessions does not, however, give us any excuse not to
perform proper post-mortem analysis.
The small percentage of analyzed projects can be
improved by analysing more projects, but the second
problem, the general unavailability of knowledge of
cancelled projects, is a much more difficult issue to
solve. It is safe to assume that the names of can-
celled projects that are repeated in many articles in-
clude those cases that have been either too massive
to be hidden or that have been public in some legal
sense. A good example of research that uses well-
known cancelled projects, some of which have been
discussed in (Glass, 1999), is the one performed by
Chua (2009). Most of the new cases that appear in
newspapers or in scientific journals seem to fall into
the same category of massive or public cancellations.
Other cancellations are concealed inside the organi-
zations, which is very understandable because nei-
ther the organizations nor the individuals involved
want the details of those projects to appear in any
media. The tendency to hide cancelled projects is in-
tensified in those cases in which the supplier and the
customer are separate companies.
Although some projects may be cancelled for
reasons related to changes in the business environ-
ment or some other outside reasons, many cancelled
projects would have succeeded if mistakes had not
been made before or during the project execution.
Those projects are very interesting because under-
standing why the cancellation took place would help
us to avoid similar mistakes in the future. That un-
derstanding is especially important in order to reduce
the unnecessary waste of resources.
It should be noted, however, that we do not as-
sume that no project should fail. Failure is an essen-
tial part of high-risk projects, especially in the case
of R&D projects. Although some types of projects
are much more likely to fail than other types, unnec-
essary failures should be avoided if possible.
In order to achieve better understanding of the
mistakes that caused project cancellations, we ana-
lyzed five cancelled software projects which should
have succeeded. One case was an internal product
development project and in the other cases the cus-
tomer and the supplier were separate companies. In
those cases the supplier had made an agreement with
the customer for a specific project and agreed to de-
liver the project outcome to the customer. The aim
of the study was to find out why these five projects
suffered cancellation. This knowledge will help us
to understand software projects better and relieve the
impact of project cancellations.
The study reported in this paper was possible
because of the unusually rich sets of project data
that each case provided for research purposes. Each
case allowed us to cut into the body of the deceased
project, the body being the paperwork that includes
all types of official and unofficial documents related
to the project. In the analysis we looked into what
happened in the projects, and especially into the ac-
tual problems encountered during the projects. The
2
analyzed cases are described in Section 3 and the
analysis methodology is presented in Section 4.
In Section 5 we discuss the findings of the post-
mortem analysis for each case. The reasons for
the cancellations did not provide any real surprises.
However, it was surprising that in four cases we were
not able to find the cause of the cancellation reason
from the documentation which is normally regarded
as project documentation. Our inability to find the
causes from the project documentation itself led us
to extend the analysis to all available documentation.
The results of that analysis are presented in Section
6. They show that four of the projects were doomed
even before they were started, and that even the most
valiant efforts of all stakeholders might not have been
able to salvage the project.
Section 7 presents a brief discussion of the pos-
sibility of avoiding project cancellations in the an-
alyzed cases. The validity of results is discussed in
Section 8: these threats to validity are noteworthy but
not serious regarding the results of the study.
The final section, Section 9, ends the article with
the conclusion that in many of the cancelled projects
the actual cause of the cancellation reason may be
hidden somewhere in the actions that took place be-
fore the project started.
2. Related research and post-mortem methods
This section discusses related research, both re-
search on post-mortem analysis methods and on the
use of post-mortem analysis in order to learn from
previous experiences of cancelled projects. How-
ever, such learning is quite difficult because very
few results of post-mortems of cancelled project have
been reported.
The concept of a post-mortem analysis is not very
straightforward because it seems to be a fairly versa-
tile tool. It can be used for the analysis of the end
product of the project, the program, as in the research
reported by Zhang and Iyer (2007), or for helping
software process simulation in order to improve soft-
ware project estimation (Aguilar-Ruiz et al., 2001).
In this article, post-mortem analysis means an analy-
sis performed in order to achieve understanding of a
project that has already ended.
There seems to be a general agreement about the
necessity of post-mortems (Reel, 1999; Glass, 2001;
Birk et al., 2002; Ewusi-Mensah, 2003; Verner and
Evanco, 2005), but still they are quite seldom per-
formed (Verner and Evanco, 2005). One of the rea-
sons for this may be that learning from past projects
is important but it is not that easy to learn the “hard”,
non-intuitive lessons (Williams, 2004). Moreover,
concern about frank analysis especially of failure
creates a natural disincentive within the organization
to conduct a post-mortem; it also creates apprehen-
sion in the individual preparing to take part in ones
that are held (Collier et al., 1996). But post-mortems
are especially important if we are to learn from prob-
lems encountered during a project (Williams, 2004;
Verner and Evanco, 2005). If one does not take time
to find out what happened during a failed project, for
example, then one is doomed to repeat the same mis-
takes (Reel, 1999; Ewusi-Mensah, 2003; Verner and
Evanco, 2005). It is, however, the case that most can-
celled projects are not analyzed at all (von Zedtwitz,
2002).
In order to make people more willing to perform
post-mortems, the post-mortem process should be
well defined (Collier et al., 1996). Fortunately, there
are some reasonably detailed descriptions of post-
mortem process in e.g. (Tiedeman, 1990; Whitten,
1995; Collier et al., 1996; Collison and Parcell, 2001;
Birk et al., 2002). All these processes are somewhat
different but they have the same general structure,
which can be simplified into four phases:
1. Data collection, of which there are two basic
variations. In both, data are collected from
team members, and the variation lies in the uti-
lization of project documentation. Some pro-
cesses use it, whereas others do not. The data
collection can be performed by interviews and
questionnaires, or a combination of the two.
2. A workshop meeting, in which at least some
the people who participated in the project are
present. It can consist of different types of
discussion or more formal analysis methods.
During the workshop, various techniques such
as structured discussions, causal maps, and
fishbone diagrams can be used to elicit tacit
knowledge from the participants.
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3. The analysis of the data, which can be per-
formed during a workshop or separately. The
analysis methods may include statistical meth-
ods for the analysis of metrics or some other
type of suitable data, fishbone diagrams, and
causal maps.
4. The last phase is the reporting and publishing
of the results.
The common phases of the processes heavily depend
on the participation of the project team members and
the subjective opinions expressed by them. The role
of the documentation does not seem to be very im-
portant when compared with the role of the work-
shops and interviews.
Post-mortem methods that fully utilize project
documentation are not very numerous. The most
comprehensive methods are the post-mortem analy-
sis process presented by Collier et al. (1996) and the
method proposed by Ewusi-Mensah (2003). Both of
those approaches have their own shortcomings, how-
ever.
The process outlined by Collier et al. (1996) con-
sists of reasonably well defined steps and enables the
organization to produce fairly controlled and struc-
tured results and to use a predefined process for
project post-mortems. The disadvantage of the pro-
cess is that it requires the project team to be available.
That may not be possible in many cases because the
developers have moved to other projects and are not
likely to be available, as has been accurately noted
by Glass (2001).
A three-sided post-mortem process has been pro-
posed in (Ewusi-Mensah, 2003, p. 198). It con-
sists principally of three steps: 1) a questionnaire,
2) structured interviews, and 3) analysis of archival
data. The method seems to be the most compre-
hensive post-mortem analysis method available, al-
though it does not specify how to analyze the archival
data. It does have, however, the same drawback as
the process proposed by Collier et al. (1996), namely
the requirement of the availability of the project team
for interview and questioning.
Most studies on project post-mortems have used
methods that require either the active participation
of the project team or a combination of the utiliza-
tion of the project material and the active participa-
tion of the project team. In our case, the members of
the project team were not available, but we had rich
sets of project documentation, which were as com-
plete as could be expected and included a variety
of additional documents. In addition, our aim was
to find out the actual cause behind the cancellation
and that means causal analysis. Reported studies on
causal analysis of projects have used fishbone dia-
grams, causal maps, and analysis of answers to ques-
tionnaires, in order to find out the causal relations. In
all those methods the participation of the members of
the project team is necessary.
The unavailability of the original project teams,
the reasons of which are explained in Section 3 and
in the Appendix, made all those post-mortem meth-
ods unsuitable for us. In order to perform the analy-
sis we developed a post-mortem analysis method that
is suitable for the causal analysis of rich documenta-
tion. The method is described in Section 4. In the
following section, the data and the background of the
data are described in more detail.
3. Data available for research
3.1. Data Sources
The number of software project cancellations
available for scientific research is unfortunately
small. That can be explained by the fact that com-
panies are reluctant to tell the outside world about
their failures, and by the fact that over 70% of orga-
nizations do not keep records of cancelled IS projects
(Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski, 1995). It is, how-
ever, very important to analyze and understand real-
world cancellations in order to be able to avoid re-
peating the mistakes that someone has made before.
Therefore, the analysis of cancelled projects should
be performed in as many cases as possible.
We had an opportunity to analyze almost com-
plete project documentation of cancelled software
engineering projects. Normally, any type of detailed
data on software engineering cancellations is strictly
confidential and very difficult to get access to. In
these cases one of the authors had been involved in
the case either as an employee of the software sup-
plier or the customer, or as a consultant hired by the
supplier or the customer. The type of involvement is
described separately for each case in the Appendix.
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The possible impact of the involvement on the va-
lidity of the research is discussed in Section 8. The
availability of the detailed data is due to this involve-
ment and to the benevolence of the companies in-
volved.
The projects we analyzed are outlined in as much
detail as possible, although the organizations in-
volved do require anonymity in order to allow us to
report anything at all. Therefore, it was necessary
for us to omit some interesting information from the
descriptions.
The data includes all existing software engineer-
ing process documentation such as technical docu-
ments, project plans, minutes of meetings, emails re-
lated to the project, and different types of memos.
The available documentation includes everything
that can be reasonably expected to be found after a
project has been cancelled. In some cases the doc-
umentation includes additional information such as
emails kindly turned over for research purposes. In
addition to the normal project documentation, each
case included a specific set of documents that were
created to help in making the decision whether to
continue the project or cancel it. The authors were
involved in the cases during the evaluation of the
project and as part of the team which created the re-
port that was to be used when the customer made the
cancellation decision.
An unfortunate side-effect of the type of cases
is that the companies are not willing to admit offi-
cially that the projects existed in the first place. Addi-
tional interviews would have required the permission
of the management of each company. Such permis-
sions were requested but not given. Interviewing in-
dividual persons without the permission of the man-
agement would not have been ethical even in those
cases where the individuals would have thought that
their personal non-disclosure agreements would al-
low them to be interviewed. The permissions to use
the data for research purposes were acquired in the
beginning of the authors’ involvement. The permis-
sions to use the data have not been revoked, but the
companies require complete anonymity and impose
strict limits on the details that can be reported.
The smallest set of documentation consists of
over one thousand pages. In two cases, the docu-
mentation was available only in printed form, and in
three cases it was in electronic form. Some of the
printed documentation was converted into electronic
form for research purposes.
3.2. The cases
The cases can be classified as shown in Table
1. The term ‘contractual’ is used in cases where the
software development project was not done in-house.
In other words, in those cases the software devel-
opment project was performed under a commercial
contract and the supplier company and the customer
company were separate entities.
The common feature in the cases is that practi-
cally nothing of any project was salvaged. The only
exception was Case D, in which the requirements
documents were reused in the new project. Even in
that case, the line drawn between complete cancella-
tion and partial cancellation is not clear.
For a more detailed understanding of the cases
analyzed, some of the basic numbers concerning
the cases are shown in Table 2, and more extensive
textual descriptions are presented in the Appendix.
Some data has been left out of the descriptions and
will be introduced during the analysis.
4. Research methodology
The research method used in the reported study
is case study. A definition of case study research has
been provided by Myers (2009, p. 76):
Case study research in business uses em-
pirical evidence from one or more orga-
nizations where an attempt is made to
study the subject matter in context. Mul-
tiple sources of evidence are used, al-
though most of the evidence comes from
interviews and documents.
The unit of analysis in this study was one can-
celled software engineering project. Every project
was from a different company and each company
was involved in only one case, either as a supplier,
a customer, or a company with an in-house devel-
opment unit. Four cases out of five involved both
the supplier and the customer companies, and the
5
Table 1: Case names and brief descriptions.
Name Type of project Type of cancellation
Case A Contractual tailoring of an existing ERP
system for the customer.
Complete. The supplier paid compensation to the
customer.
Case B Contractual redesign of the complete soft-
ware and systems architecture for the cus-
tomer.
Complete. The supplier reimbursed most of the
costs to the customer.
Case C Contractual creation of a new tailored sys-
tem for a customer to replace an existing
one.
Complete. The customer paid the bills but did not
use the new system at all.
Case D In-house product development project
aiming to replace the existing family of
software products.
Partial. The project was discontinued and a new
project was started. The requirement engineering
documents were reused in the new project.
Case E Contractual product development com-
missioned by a few major customers.
Complete. The cancellation resulted in the
bankruptcy of the supplier.
Table 2: Basic numbers.
Parameter Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
Planned duration 12 months 8 months 14 months 18 months 17 months
Realized duration before cancel-
lation
10 months 9 months 15 months 14 months 24 months
Planned effort (effective work-
ing days)
560 280 3570 7800 5500
Realized effort (effective work-
ing days)
> 600 > 320 > 4000 > 6100 > 7350
Total team size (full and part
time involvement)
14 11 22 42 23
story of the cases is the story of the organizations in-
volved, which is a common situation in case studies
of projects (Myers, 2009, p. 76).
The analysis of the cases was performed in two
phases. The time elapsed between the phases was
a few years in some cases. The delay between the
first analysis phase and further analysis was required
by the companies that agreed to cede the data for re-
search purposes.
The first phase consisted of the evaluation of the
project before the cancellation decision, or after the
cancellation decision when the customer was consid-
ering the possibility of disputing the results of the
project. One of the authors was a member of the
evaluation team in each case.
The team analyzed project documentation and
interviewed people involved in the project. The
team produced a report that was fundamental in the
customer’s decision making: it formed part of the
project documentation used in the second phase of
the evaluation. Although the first phase was con-
ducted for other purposes than academic research,
the overall research methodology is within the case
study paradigm.
The second phase of the analysis was performed
by the authors. During this phase, the whole project
documentation was analyzed including reports cre-
ated during the first phase. The re-analysis of doc-
umentation was performed in order to gain new in-
sights and avoid possible interpretational or reason-
ing errors made during the first phase. The analysis
was performed as described in this section.
The second phase was based on the available doc-
umentation. Interviews could not be conducted be-
cause the authors did not get permission to interview
the people involved. However, some parts of the
documentation that were difficult to understand, am-
biguous or missing were clarified by contacting some
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people who participated in the project from either the
customer’s or the supplier’s side. Not all inquiries
were answered, but the answers that were given pro-
vided clarifications for some specific details.
In our case there were none of the normal difficul-
ties in getting access to the relevant documentation.
The available documentation was rich and allowed
many different types of analysis to be performed. It
was authentic and credible, and there was no doubt of
the representativeness of the documents. Since infor-
mation gathered from analysis of project records and
documents has been shown to be invaluable in get-
ting at the “hidden” agenda that may be at the root of
the some of the failed development projects in orga-
nizations (Ewusi-Mensah, 2003, p. 199) it was possi-
ble to trace the root cause of the cancellation reason.
It is not plausible to assume that the root cause
could have been found by interviewing people (Glass
et al., 2008). All of the cancelled projects were so
sensitive that it would have been very difficult to find
persons who would have been willing to answer in-
convenient questions (Myers, 2009, p. 127). That
reluctance is amplified by the fact that a company
which might someday end up in court is wary about
calling attention to the way it captures information
about its failures (Collier et al., 1996).
Since we could research almost the complete
documentation of the projects, it was possible to tri-
angulate the analysis by cross-checking each inter-
pretation from several documents. This was possi-
ble because there were many documents related to
the same subject, and in many cases individual doc-
uments had been created by different individuals.
We used several approaches to analyze the doc-
umentation. The number of pages was so huge that
we had to make some classifications, which are ex-
plained below. We identified critical incidents that
were deemed by the researchers to be extremely im-
portant and pertinent to the study. We also identified
series of project management and project execution
events and organized them by chronological chain of
events in order to find causal explanations of critical
incidents.
We analyzed the cases using the documentation
of each project in the following way. (It should be
noted that the document analysis was a step-by-step
process and the results were cross-checked after each
step.)
1. All documentation was classified into the fol-
lowing categories:
• Documents that outlined the actual aims
of the project.
• Administrative documentation of the
project, e.g. minutes of meetings,
memos.
• Technical documents such as program
listings.
• Other documents, e.g. emails.
• Documents that were directly related to
the actual cancellation decision.
• Other types of documents.
A single document might belong to several cat-
egories.
2. The documentation was classified according to
the general structure of a software engineering






The classification was done in order to make
the amount of documentation more manage-
able, not to assume that the project had pro-
ceeded using the waterfall model.
3. The documents left unclassified during step 2
were classified into two extra classes, which
have been described by Haapio and Ahonen
(2006) and Artto et al. (2008):
• Pre-project
• Post-project.
4. The project was reconstructed from the catego-
rized documents by anchoring individual doc-
uments and their contents to the timescale of
the project.
5. The incidents and issues that were considered
by the authors to have a significant impact on
the cancellation of the project or that were oth-
erwise considered interesting were identified
and analyzed.
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6. The cancellation decision, its documented rea-
son, and the root cause of the reason were
traced from the documentation.
The completeness of the material allowed us to
analyze the projects in detail to try to get a deeper
understanding of what went wrong. First we iden-
tified the actual decision and the documentation as-
sociated with it. Then the reasons for that decision
were sought and we followed the project backwards
in time in order to search for the actual causes, the
root causes, behind the reason for the cancellation
decision. In some projects, extracting the cause of
the reason was not as easy as expected.
5. Post-mortem analysis of five software project
cancellations
5.1. Analysis of the cases
The categorized and classified documentation
was analyzed according to the document classes de-
fined in Step 2 of the methodology described in Sec-
tion 4. The first class of documents is the require-
ments class, i.e. those classified as belonging to the
requirements phase. From this documentation, all in-
teresting incidents and issues were extracted. This
was performed for every phase from Requirements
to Project Management.
The incidents and issues belonging to the require-
ments phase are shown in Table 3. It was interest-
ing to note that Case A, Case C, and Case E had, in
principle, very clear and precise requirements avail-
able from the beginning of the project. In Case E
there was, however, no documentation that would
have shown that the supplier could understand the
technical demands of the requirements. The gen-
eral vagueness of the requirements phase of Case B
was intensified by the poor project management and
the selected way of working. Case D encountered
the common requirements engineering problems of
the unavailability of domain experts and a too strict
timetable.
The incidents and issues belonging to the design
phase are shown in Table 4. In Case A the architec-
ture of the new system was based on the existing sys-
tem, which was to be somewhat tailored. The design
of the tailoring turned out to be very difficult because
Table 3: Incidents and issues belonging to the requirements
phase of the project life-cycle.
Case A - Very clear requirements had been created
by the customer long before the project
started.
Case B - The requirements were collected by using
workshops and similar activities.
- The customer had only a vague idea of the
target, which should have been outlined
during this phase.
- The elicited requirements were poorly
documented and reported.
Case C - Already elicited. Requirements were
clear and well defined.
Case D - The experts from the sales and customer
projects were not as available as they
should have been.
- The timetable was too tight considering
the lack of the availability of experts from
sales and customer projects.
Case E - Easy. The basic theory behind the re-
quired functionality was generally avail-
able and well-structured.
- The supplier’s project personnel did not
really understand the technical meaning
of the requirements.
the architecture of the existing system did not enable
all the functionality required from the final software.
In Case B the vagueness of the requirements affected
the architecture design very badly, which was wor-
rying because the main aim of the project was ar-
chitecture design. In Case C there were no architec-
ture problems, but the strict timetable made it neces-
sary to drop several features. Case D was a conven-
tional technically demanding project which required
creative solutions. In Case E it was clear that the
supplier had not grasped the whole meaning of the
requirements, presumably due to a lack of theoreti-
cal knowledge.
The incidents and issues belonging to the cod-
ing and testing phases are shown in Table 5. Case A
was suffering from serious problems during the cod-
ing phase due to the extensive changes required and
the technical difficulties those changes presented. No
testing was ever performed. In Case B neither cod-
ing nor testing was present because those phases are
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Table 4: Incidents and issues belonging to the design phase of
the project life-cycle.
Case A - Architecture based on the existing sys-
tem.
- Serious architectural changes required to
the system although they had not been ex-
pected.
Case B - Architecture design was poorly docu-
mented and poorly communicated to the
customer.
Case C - Many features dropped due to the too
tight timetable.
Case D - The overall complexity of the architecture
was much greater than previous experi-
ence led to assume.
- Completely new interfaces to other sys-
tems had to be created.
Case E - Lacking understanding of the impact
of the requirements on the architecture.
Lacking theoretical knowledge.
- Agile methodology used.
not a part of an architecture project. Case C suffered
from missing or poor quality documentation. Case D
turned out to be a dead-end, and Case E never ful-
filled the aims set for it.
In addition to the incidents and issues belonging
to specific phases, project management -related ex-
traction was also performed. The results of this anal-
ysis are shown in Table 6. The project management
-related incidents and issues were not unexpected:
most of the projects suffered from some problems as-
sociated with project management. The only excep-
tion was Case E, in which the project management
had clearly been competent.
5.2. Reasons for project cancellations
The cancellation decision in Case A was made
during the coding phase and before the project had
exceeded its schedule. The customer started to ques-
tion the possibility of the overall success of the
project, and suspended it for a while in order to per-
form an evaluation of the situation. In that evalua-
tion, the technological foundation (the ERP system
that was used as the basis of the tailored system) was
discovered to be inadequate for the task due to the
architectural solutions used in the system. The cus-
tomer decided that there were no options other than
Table 5: Incidents and issues belonging to the coding and test-
ing phases of the project life-cycle.
Coding
Case A - Data conversion from the existing system
to the new one was problematic.
- The amount of work required for the nec-
essary changes was clearly too extensive
and very difficult to perform.
Case B - NA — architecture project
Case C - Missing coding documentation.
- Communication between the supplier and
the customer’s internal project team inad-
equate.
Case D - New tools were used.
Case E - Agile methodology used.
Testing
Case A - No real tests were ever run because the
system was never complete enough.
Case B - NA — architecture project
Case C - Far too buggy according to the reports by
the customer’s internal project team.
Case D - The system was tested with real data and
found to be much too slow for real use.
The architecture was deemed to be inade-
quate for the task.
Case E - The software turned out to be too buggy.
cancellation. After the project had been cancelled,
the supplier paid compensation to the customer.
In Case A the actual cancellation decision was
made after the customer had evaluated the situation.
According to the evaluation, the possibility of get-
ting a satisfactory result out of the project seemed
to be unachievable in every sense regarding costs,
schedule, and technological suitability. Although we
went through the project documentation belonging to
the phases preceding the cancellation decision many
times, we were not able to identify the actual cause
of the cancellation reason. The question why the sys-
tem to be tailored was selected in the first place re-
mained a mystery.
Case B was practically an open-ended venture.
The customer understood the need to create a new
architecture but was not able to define the target pre-
cisely. Therefore, the responsibility of the supplier
was significant and the customer had to trust the sup-
plier. The costs and the lateness of the project led
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Table 6: Incidents belonging to project management.
Case A - Insufficient amount of reporting and com-
munication.
Case B - A lightweight type of project manage-
ment had been chosen.
Case C - There was no space for flexibility in the
timetable.
- Unavailability of the customer’s upper
management for decision making and ap-
proval of different phases.
Case D - The size of the project was much greater
than that of previous projects — coordi-
nation difficulties. Reasonable manage-
ment.
Case E - Competent project management.
the customer to evaluate the results already achieved,
and the results were found to be unsatisfactory. The
customer was dissatisfied with the project and saw no
reason to continue with it. The supplier paid almost
complete reimbursement to the customer.
The decision to cancel the project in Case B was
made during the design phase, and the reason for the
cancellation was the poor quality of the results com-
bined with the overrun schedule and costs. Although
the reason for the project cancellation was clear from
the material, the cause of the problems identified as
the reason for the cancellation could not be identified
from anything that happened during the project. The
question why there were problems with quality and
the schedule remained open.
The project in Case C was plagued by great haste.
Although haste was present during the whole project,
it was completed almost in time and almost within
budget. However, the result was never used: it was
not the software that the customer had wanted, due
to poor quality and missing features. The customer’s
management decided not to use the software. The
customer did not initiate any actions against the sup-
plier.
Since the project was not continued in order to
improve the software, the project can be considered
cancelled. The decision was made after the project
was, in a sense, completed, and the reason for the
cancellation was poor quality and missing features.
Overall haste marked every aspect of this project:
for example the customer did not have enough time
to approve prototypes, and several features were
dropped in order to keep the project on time. The
question why a project with too strict a timetable was
allowed to start at all could not be answered by read-
ing the actual project documentation.
Case D was a clear example of an internal prod-
uct development project. Due to inappropriate tech-
nical decisions, the architecture of the developed
software was not capable of doing the intended task.
When the software was tested with real data it was
found to be too slow for the intended real-time use.
The higher management of the company decided
commission an evaluation of the situation and after
that evaluation it was decided that the only way to
create the product was to drop the project and start a
new one. The cancellation decision was made during
the combined coding/testing phase after the first pro-
totype was tested with real data. The reason for can-
celling the project is one of the technical reasons for
terminating research and development projects dis-
cussed in (Kumar et al., 1996). The cause of the
cancellation was the unsuitability of the selected ar-
chitecture for the situation, and this was not noticed
before the system was tested with real data.
The reason for cancelling the project in Case E
was a combination of poor quality, exceeded bud-
get, and exceeded schedule. Further analysis of the
perceived poor quality showed that the software was
not technologically up to the use for which it was in-
tended. After several buggy versions had been pro-
duced and the schedule had been exceeded, the cus-
tomers lost patience and decided to drop the project,
which caused a disastrous impact on the supplier,
leading to bankruptcy. The cancellation decision was
made during the testing phase of an iterative devel-
opment cycle.
Table 7 shows a summary of the problems en-
countered during the project, the cancellation deci-
sion, the reasons for the cancellation, and the possi-
ble cause of the cancellation. The table has an addi-
tional row showing whether there were features miss-
ing or quality problems in the project. It is notable
that in only one case could the cause be identified as
something that had taken place during the project. In
other cases we were not able to identify something
that had taken place during the project as being the
cause of the cancellation reason.
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Table 7: Problems, decisions, reasons, and causes.
Phase Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
Requirements X X
Design XR XDR X XC X
Coding XD X XD2 X
Testing X D2R XD
Project management X X X X
Poor quality and/or missing features R D1R R
X = problems, D = cancellation decision, R = reason given in the cancellation decision, C = cause of the reason.
1In Case C the cancellation decision was made after the project had ended.
2In Case D the decision was made during prototyping with real-world data.
The reasons for the cancellation decisions in-
cluded poor quality, exceeded schedules, exceeded
costs, and technologically inadequate software.
These reasons do not provide any surprises, but it
was surprising that the question why those failures
happened was very difficult to answer in any mean-
ingful sense when we considered only the project.
Only by tracking the cause of the cancellation rea-
son backwards in time were we able to identify that
cause. However, we were able to identify the cause
of the cancellation reason only for Case D, in which
the selection of an unsuitable architecture made the
actual cancellation reason (the slowness of the sys-
tem) manifest itself later.
In other cases it was not possible to identify the
cause of the cancellation reason from the normal
project documentation. Therefore we had to expand
our analysis to cover all project documentation. The
results of that analysis are presented in the next sec-
tion.
6. Doomed to fail or what happened before the
project started?
6.1. Causes of the failures
In the previous section we analysed the cases and
noted that the root cause of the cancellation deci-
sion was identified only in Case D: other cases did
not provide relevant explanations. In this section we
present the other cases and discuss the causes of the
reasons for the cancellation decisions.
When trying to identify the causes of the cancel-
lation reasons of other four cases, we summarized
our observations thus:
1. the cause that made the reason for the cancel-
lation decision valid seemed to exist from the
beginning of the project;
2. we were not able to discover all the important
reasons for the project cancellations by look-
ing at the phases of the project; therefore
3. the cause had come into existence before the
project started.
These observations made it clear that the can-
cellations of these cases cannot be sufficiently ex-
plained by something that can be clearly identified
as belonging to a specific project phase. The con-
ditions responsible for the actual cancellation reason
seemed to be present in the project from its begin-
ning, and therefore not explainable by anything that
took place during the project itself. Consequently,
we took a closer look at the part of the project doc-
umentation that had been classified as belonging to
the pre-project phase in order to find out what hap-
pened before the project actually started. The events
of each case are briefly described in the following
paragraphs.
The project to tailor an existing system to fulfill
the requirements of a competent and knowledgeable
customer, Case A, turned out to have design prob-
lems that could not be expected to be solved in a rea-
sonable time and with reasonable costs. Those prob-
lems were the reason for the cancellation decision,
although problems with coding and project manage-
ment were also present. However, the fatal problem
— the unsuitability of the architecture of the existing
system — lay behind the other problems. The project
was doomed from the start, but why?
The customer had created a detailed description
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of the target system before contacting any supplier.
That description consisted of process descriptions
and detailed specifications of the required function-
ality. After creating the documentation, the cus-
tomer made a survey of the market and contacted
promising-looking suppliers. The customer started
negotiations with one supplier and requested a de-
tailed tender.
After comparing the requirements provided by
the customer and the issues covered in the tender,
it was clear that the tender had been created with-
out any real understanding of the material provided
by the customer. Some of the critical and very com-
plicated requirements provided by the customer were
not explicitly covered in the tender, which was cre-
ated in a way that assured the customer that the
requirements would be satisfied with a reasonable
amount of changes to be made to the existing prod-
uct sold by the supplier. The agreement was based
on the tender.
The fiasco in Case A was unavoidable after the
agreement had been signed. The supplier had made
a mistake in making an unrealistic tender, and the
project could not be saved regardless of all the efforts
of the supplier or the customer. The fatal mistake
was to offer a solution that was not doable in any
reasonable way.
It is not possible to say exactly why the supplier
in Case A offered an unsuitable solution. We have
to conclude that for some reason the supplier did not
pay enough attention to the requirements documen-
tation created by the customer. If the supplier had
read carefully the material provided by the customer
and understood the requirements, it is unlikely that
the supplier would have made the tender at all.
In Case B the project was introduced to the cus-
tomer by the supplier’s representatives. The cus-
tomer understood the significance of creating an
overall architecture and asked several suppliers to
provide tenders. The supplier that had suggested the
idea was selected. This tender named several very
competent people as the project team. The agree-
ment was based on that tender.
The problems in Case B can be traced to the time
between the date of the tender and the start of the
project. The people named in the tender were very
competent and would surely have been able to handle
the project without any problems. However, when
the project started, these people were not available,
because they had been appointed to other projects
before the start of the project. Therefore, one of the
tasks of project managers, namely making sure that
the right people are in the right jobs (Moore, 1999),
was out of the control of the project manager. The
supplier had to use less experienced people for a very
demanding project. Problems were inevitable, and
the cause of the cancellation can be identified as the
staffing decision.
In Case C the customer had made an internal
decision to replace an existing system with a com-
pletely new one. The customer created a good anal-
ysis of the target system before inviting tenders from
several suppliers. Only one of the tenders was inter-
esting to the customer, who negotiated an agreement
with the supplier. In the agreement, the price of the
project was the same as in the original tender, but
the proposed timetable was shortened fairly dramati-
cally because the upper management of the customer
wanted the project to be completed as soon as possi-
ble.
The schedule was fixed in the agreement and was
deemed doable but clearly too ambitious by the ex-
perts on both the customer and the supplier side. Al-
though the schedule was tight, the supplier acceded
to the desires of the customer’s upper management,
and both parties signed an agreement with that tight
schedule. We assume that the reason why the sup-
plier agreed to the schedule was the fact that the cus-
tomer did not haggle over the price quoted in the ten-
der. It could be that the profit-oriented optimization
of the supplier’s project portfolio won over caution.
That is fairly understandable if we consider the op-
timization of the sales and delivery project portfo-
lio in the sense presented by Tikkanen et al. (2007).
However, this was a mistake, made before the project
started and which made a successful outcome less
likely. The cancellation of the software developed in
Case C was fundamentally caused by the schedule
being too tight. This is consistent with the finding
of Glass (1998), who noted that the schedule is often
the most serious problem.
The story of Case E is actually a tragic one. The
supplier had a few major customers with whom they
worked in happy cooperation. They asked the sup-
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plier to extend the software for a good price, and the
supplier agreed. However, that was a serious mis-
take because the supplier did not really know how
to create the requested functionality. The supplier
promised to do something technically very demand-
ing that they had never done before. Their lack of
knowledge was evident from the technical documen-
tation and plans created during the project, and that
lack doomed the project from the start. Obviously, it
is not wise to agree to do something that you do not
know how to do.
All four projects analyzed in this section were
projects in which the customer and the supplier were
separate companies. The supplier had agreed to de-
liver the outcome of the project to the customer.
However, each project ended in a cancellation due to
fatal mistakes made before the project started, mis-
takes that made it either impossible or very difficult
to salvage the project.
6.2. Summary
The real cause of the failure in these cases was
a fatal mistake made before the project started, re-
lated to the tendering, to the agreement or to some-
thing else that happened before the beginning of the
project.
In our analysis we encountered four of such mis-
takes:
• Making an unrealistic tender or agreement due
to lack of understanding of the real needs of
the customer (Case A);
• Staffing decision made due to the unavailabil-
ity of experienced people when the project
team was selected (Case B);
• Taking serious risks by agreeing to the cus-
tomer’s demands of a tight schedule (Case C);
and
• Promising to extend the functionality of an ex-
isting product without deep understanding of
the technical problem (Case E).
The pre-project phase where all these mistakes were
made precedes the project and has also been dis-
cussed in (Haapio and Ahonen, 2006) and (Artto
et al., 2008). The timing of the critical mistakes in
each case is shown in Figure 1. To facilitate com-
parison, the timing of the mistake made in Case D is
also shown.
Figure 1: The timing of the mistakes.
The critical mistakes in Case A, Case C and Case
E were made before signing the contract with the
customer, during the tendering/negotiations phase.
In Case B the mistake was made during the final se-
lection of the project team. This could not be done
before the customer had made the order, but was
done before the project started. This can be consid-
ered to be the project start-up phase (Fangel, 1991;
Turner and Cochrane, 1993). In Case D the mistake
was made during the actual project.
The types of fatal mistakes and the pre-project
phase in which they were made should make one
reconsider the reasons for project failures. Even
the most valiant efforts of the project manager, the
project team, and the management of both the sup-
plier and the customer may not be enough to salvage
a project if a serious enough mistake has been made
before the project starts.
The results of our analysis provide interesting in-
sight into the cancellations of software engineering
projects.
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7. Would it have been possible to avoid the disas-
ter, and could it have been foreseen?
Although the root cause of the project cancella-
tion was found in every case analyzed, it is necessary
to consider whether it could have been possible to
avoid the project failure. In this section we consider
the possibilities.
In Case A the mistake was made in the tender-
ing/negotiations phase by proposing an unsuitable
solution. In this case it would have been impossi-
ble to achieve success with the product regardless
of any project management efforts. Therefore, the
project could not have been salvaged after the tender
had been accepted by the customer. The only way
for the supplier to avoid problems would have been
not to offer the project at all, or at least not to have
signed the agreement.
A careful analysis of the material provided by the
customer would have enabled the supplier to realize
that their product was unsuitable for the intended use.
Hence, the upcoming project failure would have been
foreseen even before the supplier made the final ten-
der.
In Case B the mistake was made during the se-
lection of the project team. The possibility of suc-
cessfully completing the project existed in Case B
even after the project started. Although the project
team was not suitable for the project, it would have
been possible to correct the course of the project
by changing the team before the project started or
when it had been going for a very short time. When
the project had been going for some time, the pos-
sibility of avoiding failure diminished. However, it
is not clear that the supplier could have made any
changes in the team. The available evidence suggests
that more suitable people were not available during
the time: they were involved in other projects, and
had no time for Case B. This shows how important
it is for a company that sells projects to time sales
and project operations in a way that makes unwanted
consequences less likely. The realization that there
were problems was, to some extent, delayed by the
selected lightweight project management protocol.
The importance of the timing of new projects
with current projects has been discussed by Cooper
and Budd (2007), and the real-world consequences
of unexpected delays or other disruptions can lead to
a project failure as in Case B. The supplier had only
undesirable alternatives available, because transfer-
ring the team promised in the tender to the project
would have endangered other projects, and select-
ing other people made the success of the project less
likely. The supplier made the decision to use a less
experienced team before the project started, and the
project failed.
In Case C the problem of a too tight schedule
was present from the tendering/negotiations phase.
The supplier’s and the customer’s experts were well
aware of the dangers that the schedule presented.
The supplier’s and the customer’s management de-
cided to take the risk and signed an agreement, and
the project failed. It could have been saved by
rescheduling the project, but there are always or-
ganizational issues and psychological reasons why
such actions are not taken. In addition, rescheduling
would have required renegotiating the project agree-
ment. In other words, the project could not have been
saved without changing the agreement: no other ac-
tion would have been sufficient. In that sense, it can
be said the project described in the agreement could
not have been saved after the agreement had been
signed.
The only in-house project, Case D, was a viable
project up to the architectural decision. Thereafter,
the possibility of making the project a success di-
minished. After a while, the amount of work spent
in implementing the wrong architecture made it less
likely that success could be achieved without starting
afresh. The unsuitability of the architecture could
not have been noticed without previous experience
of similar architectures, or without testing the system
with real data.
In Case E the original mistake was made in the
tendering/negotiations phase. However, the project
could have been saved by getting the required techni-
cal know-how from outside sources. The possibility
of avoiding disaster was present until the patience of
the customers wore out.
In three cases the mistake was made during the
tendering/negotiations phase, in one case during the
start-up, and in one case during the actual project, as
seen in Table 8. The timing of the mistake has a de-
cisive impact on the possibility of avoiding disaster
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Table 8: The time of the mistake and the possibility of avoiding the disaster.
Phase Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
Tendering/negotiations M M M
Agreement L L C
Project start-up — M — C
Actual project — L — M C
M = Time when the mistake was made. C = Mistake was still correctable. L = It was too late to correct the mistake
after this point. — = Nothing could be done any more.
after the mistake has been made.
8. Validity of results
8.1. Construct validity
The common threat to the construct validity of
case studies is the failure to develop a sufficiently
operational set of measures, and the use of subjec-
tive judgments to collect data (Yin, 2009, p. 41). Our
study was based on documentation and a few eluci-
dating answers to clarifying questions. In each case
the documentation included the complete project
documentation and a large number of emails and
memos related to the project. The available docu-
mentation was rich, authentic, and credible, and there
was no doubt of the representativeness of the doc-
uments. In each case there were many documents
related to the same subject, and in many cases indi-
vidual documents had been created by different indi-
viduals. Hence, there were multiple sources of ev-
idence and we did not need to made any subjective
judgments in the data collection.
Processes for developing software are well-
known (see e.g. (Royce, 1998), (Pressman, 2005),
and (Sommerville, 2007)). We were able to re-
construct the projects and their internal structure by
using this knowledge and available material. The
reconstruction was based on the methodology de-
scribed in Section 4 and the general structure of a
software engineering project. Our study relies on
documentation around the cancellation decision, the
documented reasons for the cancellation decision,
and the completeness of the available documenta-
tion.
The main methods to increase construct validity
are the use of multiple sources of evidence, estab-
lishing a chain of evidence, and having the draft case
study report reviewed by key informants (Yin, 2009,
p. 41). The chain of evidence was complete because
the material was without gaps in each case. The com-
plete material enabled us to achieve our aim of the re-
construction of the chain of events, and therefore the
chain of evidence for every case. It was not possible
to have the members of the original project teams re-
view the draft reports and review our analysis, for the
reason explained in Subsection 3.1. However, due to
the nature of the material, the construct validity of
the study is not threatened.
8.2. Internal validity
Although internal validity is a concern for causal
case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 42), that threat is not
a major concern in our study. The causal reason-
ing of our analysis was based on the possibility of
following individual events and issues backwards in
time by using the reconstructed project. Our anal-
ysis of the causal relations between events and is-
sues was supported by the software engineering liter-
ature, including software development process mod-
els, which made it possible for us to check our causal
interpretations in the light of previously validated
knowledge of software projects.
Because the project documentation of our cases
consists of many documents concerning similar sub-
jects (e.g. emails, memos, reports, tenders, and
agreements), it was possible to compare them and
check our interpretations from several documents
written by different individuals. The possibility of
errors in the documentation itself cannot be dis-
counted, although the completeness of the documen-
tation provided us with ways to make the possible
impact of such errors very small. The possibility
of checking the results from several documents and
evaluate them in the light of well-known knowledge
on software development make our logic valid.
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It is, however, a threat to validity that both au-
thors were aware of the evaluation reports produced
during the first phase of the analysis, i.e. the reports
that documented the cancellation reason. The influ-
ence of the evaluation report was minimized by ana-
lyzing alternative causes of individual incidents and
issues. Knowledge from previous research on soft-
ware engineering projects and careful analysis of the
material made it possible to reconstruct the justifica-
tion of the cancellation decision and therefore mini-
mize the influence of the original report.
8.3. External validity
External validity refers to the problem of know-
ing whether the findings are generalizable beyond the
immediate case study (Yin, 2009, p. 43). The main
threat to the external validity of our study arises from
the possibility that the analyzed cases are unique.
Although there are several unique characteristics in
each case, four cases have some common features
also: one is an inherent feature of the cases and the
other is that the mistake was made before the project
started.
The inherent feature of the four cases is the
customer-supplier relationship, and the fact that the
supplier had agreed to deliver the project outcome to
the external customer. In Case A, the supplier had
agreed to execute a project and both modify and ex-
tend an existing system for the customer; in Case
B, the project was completely customer specific; in
Case C, the supplier had agreed to develop a bespoke
system for the customer; and in Case E, the supplier
had agreed to extend its existing software product
for its major customers. All these cases were dif-
ferent software engineering projects but in each case
the outcome of the project was supposed to be de-
livered to the customer. The other common feature
in these four cases is that the mistake was made be-
fore the project start, in the pre-project phase. These
mistakes are discussed in Sections 6 and 7.
Case D was different, being an in-house prod-
uct development project. In that case there was no
customer-supplier relationship in the same way as in
the other four cases.
Given the foregoing, we propose that the results
of our study may be generalized to those cases in
which there is a customer-supplier relationship and
the supplier has sold a project to the customer.
8.4. Reliability
Reliability means that another investigator is able
to follow the instructions and conduct the same case
study all over again, and will arrive at the same find-
ings and conclusions (Yin, 2009, p. 45). In our study,
the reliability of the results has been assured by us-
ing a well-defined analysis methodology, discussed
in Section 4. The step-wise analysis was possible due
to the completeness of the material. In addition, each
author performed his/her analysis independently.
8.5. Biased perception and interpretation
Although the authors’ involvement in the cases
made the data available in the first place, it may have
had a negative impact on the validity of the inter-
pretations. The type of authors’ involvement is de-
scribed in Section 3 and in the Appendix. In each
case the involvement started when the project was al-
ready troubled. The role of the author involved was
to participate in the evaluation team, which analyzed
the project and the possibility of making the project
succeed. The authors were not involved in perform-
ing the actual project, only in evaluating it. There-
fore, personal involvement does not threaten the va-
lidity of the analysis of the root causes of the cancel-
lations. It is, however, likely that the author who was
familiar with the case in the first place influenced the
perceptions of the other author. That influence was
minimized in the same way as the influence of the
previous knowledge was minimized in the case of the
author who was a member of the original evaluation
team. The minimization method used careful plan-
ning of the analysis and cross-checking of the results
from several documents.
8.6. Summary
It can be concluded that the threats to the va-
lidity of the study are noteworthy but not serious.
This is due to the nature of the analyzed material and
the selected analysis methodology. Therefore, it is
reasonable to propose that a considerable proportion
of software project cancellations may be caused by




In this article we report an analysis of five can-
celled software engineering projects as thoroughly as
possible. The detailed analysis was made possible
by the availability of complete documentation of the
cases. Our aim was to identify the cancellation deci-
sion, the reason for that decision, and the root causes
behind the reasons, with the help of in-depth analy-
sis of the documentation. This proved to be straight-
forward. The reasons could be classified as quality
failures or project implementation failures, which are
the most common reasons for project cancellations
(Pinto and Mantel Jr., 1990).
The analysis revealed that in three cases a seri-
ous mistake, which was not foreseen, was made dur-
ing the tendering/negotiation phase, resulting in can-
cellation of the projects. In one case, the result of
analysis revealed another finding: a supplier made a
mistake after receivingthe order from a customer but
before the project started. As a result of the mistake,
this project was also cancelled. Although there were
several unique characteristics in each case, the com-
mon features found were the fact that in these four
cases the outcome of the project was supposed to be
delivered to the external customer, and that mistakes
were made before the project started, either during
the tendering phase or after the supplier got the order
but before the project start.
Our findings lead us to conclude that in quite
a few projects it is likely that serious mistakes
are made before the project has started in similar
customer-supplier situations. Those mistakes may
have huge economic impacts on both the supplier and
the customer, and may even lead to the bankruptcy
of the supplier, as in Case E. Therefore, further
research on the impact of the pre-project phase,
i.e. the sales/negotiations phase and the project start-
up phase, and on the success of software projects is
required in order to evade negative results and avoid
unnecessary waste of resources.
Appendix:
Brief descriptions of the cancellation cases
CASE A: Tailoring an existing ERP system for the
customer
The case consists of a fairly long process in
which the customer decided to replace its existing
ERP (enterprise resource planning) system with a
new one. The customer created a complete descrip-
tion of the desired situation, including detailed lists
of the required features of the software, descrip-
tions of processes and information flows between
the phases of the processes, and similar very high-
quality documentation.
After completing the requirements document, the
customer made a survey of the systems available in
the market and noted the following issues: due to the
specific nature of the field of the business of the cus-
tomer, no ready systems were immediately available.
The customer selected two systems that seemed to be
fairly suitable for further analysis and tailoring, and
contacted the suppliers of those systems directly. Af-
ter brief evaluation, one of the systems was selected
for further negotiations.
The customer had several extensive meetings
with the selected supplier. The supplier delivered
a written tender to the customer, indicating that the
system either already covered all the requirements
of the customer or could easily be tailored to cover
all the missing features. The supplier said that the
amount of tailoring required could be done in at most
560 effective working days.
Several months after the start of the project, the
customer refused to pay further bills due to the lack
of tangible results. The supplier reported the situa-
tion as well as it could, but there was a clear imbal-
ance between the hours reported and billed, and the
results. In addition, it turned out that the supplier
had severe problems with its own technology. Dur-
ing that time the supplier had reported over 600 days
of work.
One month later the customer demanded that the
project manager of the supplier should be changed.
After the change, the customer and the supplier per-
formed a detailed analysis of the situation and the
possibilities of completing the project in any reason-
able way.
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After the analysis, the supplier and the customer
arranged a seminar during which the most critical
features not already present in the system were eval-
uated. At the same time the supplier’s project man-
ager estimated that the remaining tailoring would re-
quire several times the originally estimated amount
of work. It was also realized that the system did not
provide even the already promised features that were
required by the customer.
One of the authors was part of a team that was
commissioned by the customer to arrange the semi-
nar and evaluate the project in order to consider the
possibility of continuing it. Before and during the
seminar, several people from the supplier’s and the
customer’s project teams were interviewed in an un-
structured way. The interviews were done to find out
whether the project teams considered a successful
completion of the project possible within a reason-
able budget and time. In addition to the interviews,
the project was evaluated through existing documen-
tation including emails. After analysing the inter-
views, the seminar as a whole, and the documents,
the external team prepared a report in which they es-
timated the alternatives. The unanimous opinion of
the team was that completing the project with rea-
sonable costs was not a viable alternative.
The customer decided that the agreement should
be broken and the project should be cancelled. The
supplier paid compensation to the customer.
CASE B: Redesign of the complete software and sys-
tems architecture for the customer
The aim of the project was to redesign the com-
plete software and systems architecture of a large
company. The project was a part of a large set of
projects aiming at the overall replacement of the ex-
isting information technology infrastructure of the
customer. The idea of the project originated from
the supplier’s consultants.
The customer invited several companies to tender
for the contract. The invitation was fairly general and
difficult to understand. Several companies submitted
tenders, one of which was chosen mainly due to the
long partnership between the customer and that sup-
plier.
Because of this partnership it was not consid-
ered necessary to sign a detailed mutually reviewed
agreement. It was decided that the project would
be defined and clarified during its run. In addi-
tion, both the supplier and the customer decided that
“a light-weight” project management protocol would
be used, and that there would be no real need for
a specific steering group or a detailed project plan.
One of the reasons given for the light-weight pro-
tocol was the excellence of the supplier’s project
group, although several of the very competent peo-
ple mentioned in the tender were not available for
this project.
The project proceeded as a series of workshops,
and the costs of the supplier’s work were billed four
times a year. Almost a year after the project started,
the customer requested some concrete results. At
that time the supplier had billed for about 320 ef-
fective working days.
There were no concrete results, which was due
to the lack of a project plan and to the selected way
of working. Most of the results were buried inside
the workshop hand-outs and memos. The customer
was unable to distill the necessary results from the
material, and the supplier was not able to provide the
results in a single report and design. The customer
made a complaint regarding the way the supplier had
managed the project and the results of the project.
The customer and the supplier then decided to
evaluate the project. The supplier initiated the eval-
uation, which was carried out by experts from both
the customer and the supplier. None of the experts
had been involved in the project during its execu-
tion. One of the present authors was a member of
the evaluation team. The team considered the results
of the project to be inadequate and the effort wasted.
The evaluation team provided the same report to both
sides.
The project was cancelled, and the customer and
the supplier agreed on compensation.
CASE C: The creation of a new tailored system for a
customer to replace an existing one
The customer decided to replace its in-house built
MIS (management information system) application
with a brand new one. After analysis of the require-
ments of the system, the customer evaluated the op-
tions: an ready application or a tailored one. After
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some analysis of the existing applications it was de-
cided that the system should be tailored.
Several suppliers were asked to provide a tender.
Only one of the tenders was interesting to the cus-
tomer, which negotiated an agreement with the sup-
plier. The extent of the project was estimated to be
about 3570 effective working days. The customer’s
upper management wanted the new system in one
year, but the customer’s internal experts considered
that it would be impossible. The supplier’s technical
experts considered that the timetable was very chal-
lenging but doable. After internal discussions, the
supplier agreed to the tight timetable. The project
planning was started after the agreement was signed.
It was decided that the application would be de-
veloped iteratively and using prototyping. There
were constant delays in getting the customer’s man-
agement to evaluate and approve the prototypes. The
fourth prototype was decided to be suitable for the
project. At that time the project was already over
two months late, but still within the budget.
The first system provided for tentative use was
much too buggy to be used. In addition, the supplier
confessed that they were unable to get the developed
system to properly communicate with the already ex-
isting ERP system. However, the supplier did get the
interface to work after extensive work.
The supplier finished the system practically in
time. Because the new system was not at all better
than the old one, and even lacked some of the fea-
tures of the old one, the customer considered the pos-
sibility of complaining. The customer commissioned
a small outside team to evaluate the possibility of
disputing the results of the project. The team in-
terviewed the supplier’s project team, the customer’s
project team, and the some of the representatives of
the customer’s management. In addition to the inter-
views the evaluation team analyzed the project doc-
umentation. The results of the evaluation were pro-
vided to the customer as a written report.
This report recommended against making a com-
plaint because of the time-table related demands of
the customer. The project was accepted one month
late. The bills were paid but the customer did not
take the system into use because most of the man-
agers preferred the old system.
CASE D: Internal product development project aim-
ing to replace an existing family of software products
The company decided to create a new version of
its application suite. One of the aims of the new ver-
sion was to integrate different applications in a clear
and coherent way which would make maintenance
and further development easier. In addition, the new
generation would be based on a different technology
from that of the old suite.
The original suite had been developed bit by bit
during the previous fifteen years. Some parts were
older than twelve years, and the suite was not prop-
erly integrated.
A total of 7800 effective working days were to be
dedicated to the development. The timetable of the
project was tight because that industry traditionally
shows new products at large exhibitions, and the tar-
geted exhibition was 18 months away, which meant
also fixed deadline.
At the beginning of the project there were diffi-
culties in creating a real project plan. The main dif-
ficulties were caused by the fact that the company
had not managed such large software projects before.
Accurate estimation of the amount of work was very
difficult because they lacked relevant experience, and
they also lacked experience in the selection of new
technology to be used.
The requirements engineering part of the project
did not proceed as well as expected due to the
unavailability of experts from the sales and cus-
tomer projects. By the time that the requirements
engineering phase and the architecture plan were
in reasonable shape, the project was clearly late.
The time available for the rest of the project was
only 6 months, including the creation of a working
demonstration system for the exhibition. However,
the project was continued according to the updated
plans.
Four months later it was realized that for perfor-
mance reasons the architecture was not suitable for
large installations. But this realization came after a
large prototype had been set up and the prototype had
been tested with real data.
The company asked several outside experts to an-
alyze the situation and recommend courses of ac-
tion. The experts analyzed the system and its in-
tended use, and carried out brief interviews with the
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project team. The outcome was clear: there was no
way to change the system in a way that would al-
low the project to proceed to a successful comple-
tion. One of the authors was a member of the outside
team.
After it was realized that the architecture was
faulty, all of the work done up to that date was aban-
doned. A new project was started with the same
amount of resources but with a new project manager
and also changes of other key persons. The require-
ments documents were reused in the new project, but
the technical solution was created from scratch.
CASE E: Product development commissioned by a
few major customers
The supplier had several customers operating
multi-site systems that communicated constantly
with each others. These customers used very large
and expensive persistent message-passing systems in
order to make the inter-system communication safe
and reliable. The customers proposed that the sup-
plier should extend its existing XML-based messag-
ing system by implementing persistence into the sys-
tem. They proposed that they could act as testers and
pay for the extended functionality.
The company started to extend its system by in-
corporating persistence into its message-passing ar-
chitecture. The first problem encountered was the
fact that the company’s software engineers were not
familiar with the concept of persistence or with the
architectural challenges caused by persistence.
The second problem manifested itself after the
company decided that it will make the extension. In
order to be useful, a persistent message-passing sys-
tem should be very reliable, and this requires sys-
tematic and extensive testing. The company was not
very familiar with such testing and did not perform
any before sending copies of the software to the pilot
customers.
The customers very soon realized that the soft-
ware was far too buggy to be used for the intended
purpose. After several new releases and corrections,
the software was still lacking both technically and
quality-wise for persistent message passing. Finally
the patience of the customers wore out and they com-
missioned an evaluation of the software by a team of
external experts. The team was asked to evaluate the
possibility of a rapid and successful completion of
the project. One of the authors was a member of this
evaluation team.
The team analyzed the architecture of the system
and interviewed representatives of the supplier com-
pany. During those interviews it was realized that
the employees of the supplier company did not know
how to solve the problems. In addition, the archi-
tecture of the system was found to be inadequate for
the intended purpose. The evaluation team reported
that it was impossible to successfully complete the
system in a short time.
After receiving this report the customers decided
to stick with more expensive systems and to drop the
new system. The cancellation of the project resulted
in the bankruptcy of the supplier.
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